Wellington at Verona by Lackland, H. M.
574 LETTERS OF T1PT0FT AND NEVILLE October
oommunia vniuersitatis causa consumpaerim. Verebar enim et vehementer
formidabam ne, cum ceteris rebus, tot excellentissimi libri, tot aummorum
sudores atque vigilie perirent.1 Conati autem sumus quantum in nobis
fuit cetera omnia volumina que ille hie habuerit cogere ; que autem in
Hybernia aunt nostre potestati haud aubiecta existunt. Ceterum cum hec
feciaaem, parum deaiderio meo satisfecisse videbar nisi pariter prouiderem
vti libri quibua iatud studium donauerit tute vniuersitatis nuntio cum
vestris optatia, turn vel maxirae ista anirai in perquirenda scientia affec-
tione, credantur. Precantes Dominum optimum maximumque vt vberea
inde diuturnosque fructus capiatis. Valeat vniuereitas veatra feliciter.
Curaim ex domo nostra iuxta Westmonaaterium quintodecimo kalendaa
Decembris.
Totus vester
G. EboracenaiB.
Wellington at Verona
I T has been taken for granted by many writers on the period of the
congress of Verona that the failure of English diplomacy at that
meeting could be ascribed to the incapacity of the English repre-
sentative, Wellington. To the charge of incapacity Lord Acton,8
Martin,8 and Lamartine4 have added that of disloyalty to Canning,
and an ingeniously modified form of this charge has been put for-
ward by Mr. J. E. S. Green in a paper read before the Royal Histo-
rical Society in November 1917,5 and in a more recent article.8
Mr. Green's theory is briefly this : that Wellington was, during
November 1822, gradually won over by Metternich to a policy
of supporting Austria, that during the latter part of the congress
he worked hand in glove with Metternich, disregarding both his
written instructions and Canning's known wishes, and that this
disloyalty towards his official superior was justified in his own
eyes by George IV's strong desire that England should continue
to act with the alliance, and by his own distrust of Canning's
policy and fear of its probable results. There are, however,
difficulties in the way of accepting this theory of Wellington's
conduct, and the most serious difficulty is not that dealt with in
Mr. Green's article in this Review. To begin with there is the fact
that Wellington had played a considerable part in putting
Canning in office.7 By no process of quibbling could he have
persuaded himself that it was fair to add to the already con-
1
 The Rylands copy inserts parte.
• Ante, iii. 800 ; review of J. F. Bright, History of England.
• Martin, Histoirt it France depuis 1789, iv. 308.
4
 Lamartine, Histoirt dt la Sestauration, vii. 106.
• Royal Hist. Soc Transactions, 3rd Ser., 3d, 1917, p. 69.
' pp. 200 f. above.
1
 See the letter of George IV to Wellington, 6 September 1822 (Wellington Dispatches,
see, u, i. 273); and Wellington to George IV, 7 September 1822 (ibid. 274-6).
 at The U
niversity of British Colom
bia Library on July 8, 2015
http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
1920 WELLINGTON AT VERONA 575
i siderable difficulties of the new secretary during his first few
months of office. If he did deceive Canning—and it can be
called nothing less than deceit, in view of the studied silence of
his dispatches .and letters to Canning as to the slightest change
in English policy at the congress—he could not.under the circum-
stances have reconciled his action with any strict code of honour.
And in view of his known character and his military standard
of obedience to his superiors, the evidence must be decisive
before we judge Wellington guilty of dishonourable conduct.
In this case the evidence is very far from being decisive.
The major part of the case against Wellington rests on Bois-le-
Comte's witness, though Mr. Green admits that Bois-le-Comte's
own theory as to the reasons for Wellington's conduct is falla-
cious. But can Bois-le-Comte be regarded as an altogether
satisfactory authority ? He was not even in as good a position
for obtaining information as Chateaubriand during the first
part of the congress, and we know that, until Montmorency left
Verona, Chateaubriand was able to learn comparatively little.
Much of his information, was probably obtained from his official
superior, La^Ferronays, who, being ambassador to Russia, was
on more^or less intimate terms with the Emperor Alexander.
That in itself supplies the reason for the necessity of obtaining
confirmation of his reports from other sources. La Ferronays
was not admitted into the most important conferences,1 and
though it is probably true that the chief personages at Verona
discussed their important schemes and expedients privately
before producing them in formal conference, they are hardly
likely to have discussed them in front of minor men at the
congress. Most of them were probably brought forward in pri-
vate interviews such as the one at which Wellington mooted
the idea of a neutral nation's ' good offices ' to Montmorency
as a means of enabling France to withdraw from her rather
embarrassing position in relation to Spain without being in-
volved in war.2 The secrecy which was supposed to envelop all
proceedings at the important conferences may be measured
by Montmorency's dismay at finding that Chateaubriand was
aware of something that had passed at one of these meetings,8
and though probably Chateaubriand was not the only diploma-
tist to be informed of secrets that he was not supposed to know,
still it is obvious that any one outside the charmed circle could
only get information at second or third hand. Bois-le-Comte's
evidence cannot then be allowed to outweigh that of the men
who dealt directly with Wellington. And the evidence we have
1
 See Gabriao in Revue des Deux Mondts, uxJiii, p. 663.
1
 Letter of Montmorency of 28 October (Viltelo, Mtmoire*, iii. lt}4).
1
 Letter of Montmorrncy of 13 November (ibid. 210-11).
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576 WELLINGTON AT VERONA Ootober
from them is in contradiction with that of Bois-le-Comte. In
the first place Chateaubriand as well as La Ferronays was on
confidential terms with the tsar. During the latter part of the
congress, after Montmorency left to make his unsuccessful
attempt to win over the authorities at Paris to the Veronese
plan of joint diplomatic action in Spain, Chateaubriand estab-
lished a considerable intimacy with Alexander.1 They certainly
discussed the Spanish question,2 and Chateaubriand must there-
fore have been at least as well supplied as Bois-le-Comte with any
information Alexander could give on the subject, whilst he was
also, as charge d'affaires of the French mission, in close com-
munication with Wellington himself. Yet his contemporary
letters represent Wellington as violently opposed to anything
the allies suggest in connexion with the Spanish problem.3
Moreover, had Wellington during the congress shown any
disposition to fall in with Metternich's views, it would be safe
to suppose that there would be some reflexion of the fact in
Metternich's own correspondence. To that consummate but
exceedingly vain diplomatist, agreement with his own opinions
was the proof of wisdom, whilst stupidity meant action contrary
to his views. But as late as 2 December he wrote to Neumann,
the Austrian representative at the court of St. James, that
Wellington had not a diplomatist's most indispensable qualities,
that he had of course never expected ' des nuances delicates et
recherchees ' from the duke, but that he had been quite unpre-
pared for the inefficiency with which the said duke had conducted
affairs at Verona, and, most suggestive of all, he instructed
Neumann to find out if the ' ligne plus acerbe ' taken by England
at Verona were to be ascribed to Wellington's instructions, or—
which he evidently expected to be the case—to Wellington's
own attitude.4 I t is obvious from this that Metternich con-
sidered that the cajolery which he speaks of in another letter6
had been in this case thrown away, and it is further obvious that
he had not met with as much success in sounding Wellington as
has been suggested. Now, 2 December is late in the history of
Verorfa. Had Wellington shown any signs of coming into line,
with Austria during November Metternich would probably have
given some intimation of the fact in this letter to London of
1
 Congris de Vkrone, c. xxxiii. 109; Hyde de Neuville, Mimoirts ei Corrupondance,
iii. l a • Ibid. pp. 106, 108.
* See his letter of 28 November (Villele, iii. 248). It must be remembered that
anything in the Congris de Virone which seems at variance with, or is not supported by,
the author's oontemporary correspondence must be looked on with suspicion, owing
to the faot that it was written many years after the event and the author's imagination
led him astray.
4
 See Mettemich's letter to Neumann in the Staate-Archiv, Vienna. I have grate-
fully to acknowledge Mr. C. K. Webster's kindness in allowing me touse his transcripts
from the Vienna archives. • See below, p. 580.
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1920 WELLINGTON AT VERONA 577
2 December. But of Wellington's supposed change of attitude
there is not the smallest trace. All the evidence points the other
way, and Metternich's language suggests rather a man who feels
that he has not met with proper support in a quarter where he
expected it, than a man speaking of a diplomatic ally or of a diplo-
matic tool. If Lord Acton's accusation that Wellington during the
congress was urging the Frenchmen on to war with Spain were true,
it would supply a ground for Metternich's attitude, since the latter
disliked the idea of a Franco-Spanish war almost, if not quite,
as much as Canning. But in view of the complete silence of
Montmorency and Chateaubriand on this subject, the accusation
must be held to be not proven. The loss of Montmorency's account
of Verona is doubtless irreparable, but it is noteworthy that
the historian who had the advantage of using it affords no sup-
port to the theory that Wellington was leading a double life at
Verona.1 Finally Gentz, who as secretary to the congress was
well acquainted with the course of events, gives exactly the
same picture of Wellington's behaviour as the two French
ambassadors, and his tone in speaking of the duke does not seem
.to imply that the latter had at all fallen in with Austrian views.*
If, then, it is not true that Wellington contributed to the
failure of English diplomacy at Verona by his disloyalty, what
is the truth about his attitude and work at this last of the great
congresses ? The difficulties in his way were enormous, and his
path was not smoothed by bis own unfortunate action in allowing
himself to be drawn into discussions on the military side of the
affair, an action that was unfortunate because it produced an
entirely erroneous impression on his hearers' minds. In spite
of this mistake, however, he was by no means so inefficient
a diplomatist as Metternich thought him. It is worthy of
note that at least one good judge of men and their abilities
rated him high,3 and in view of the absolute determination of
Alexander, Montmorency, and Metternich to intervene in some
way in the Peninsula (though they differed as to the method),
1
 Nettement, Histoirt de la Restauration, v i 273, tells us that Wellington kept
scrupulously within the limits of his instructions, and gives us a picture of the duke (in
a foot-note quoting Montmorency) ' feuilletant sans cesse ses instructions' during
sittings of the congress and ' y revenant imperturbablement quand on croyait lul
avoir fait faire quelques pas en avant'.
* e.g. 'Was nun vollends in England beschlossen werden wird — etwas Gutes
richer nioht—das weiss nur der—Gott sei bei uns—Teufel, der dies Qouvemement
jetzt allein regiert. Ich habe Grund zu glauben dass sogar Canning, der zwischen
Gott und dem Teufel mitten fame ateht, endlich aber doch wohl diesem anheim
fallen wird, noch gar nicht mit sich einig ist: und Wellington iflt wahrhaftig nicht
der Mann der ihm irgend einen gescheidten Rath . . . geben konnte' (quoted from
Gentz's journal in Schmidt-Weissenfels, Qentz, U. 229). This, written in the latter
part of November, also seems to show that the inner circle of the congress was still far
from being completely reassured as to England's future course of conduct.
1
 Gallatin, A Great Peacemaker, p. 104.
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578 WELLINGTON AT VERONA October
it is difficult to see how even a Castlereagh could have prevented
them doing so. What Wellington could do he did: as far as
intervention in Spain was concerned, his function at the congress
was to be ' an objection and an obstacle ',* and Mettemich's
outburst to Neumann is a measure of how well he played the part.
He was doomed to defeat from the beginning, but he could, and
did, hamper the proceedings of his opponents at every stage.
It has been suggested2 that he made a bad mistake in
taking Montmorency's ' simple dire ' of 20 October at more than
its literal meaning and answering it as though it embodied an
aggressive policy. Mettemich and the Prussian representative,
it has been pointed out, who were as anxious as Wellington to
avert war, were scrupulously careful to treat the paper as what it
pretended to be, purely defensive. But it muBt be remembered
that their ultimate aims were very different from those of Welling-
ton, that he wanted to avert action of any kind, while they looked
upon the ' simple dire ' as a good opportunity to put forward
their views as to joint diplomatic intervention at Madrid. Further,
the answers of Austria and Prussia rested entirely on the supposi-
tion that France might be forced into hostilities against Spain
by the action of the Spanish revolutionaries, while if Wellington
admitted this supposition as being in the least likely, he largely
weakened his own repeated assertions that the Spanish revolution
was not dangerous.3 In the extraordinarily complicated state
of the Spanish question 4 it may well have been not the least
advisable course to force the Austrian and French ministers
into the open and make them deal with facts as they were
instead of with a purely hypothetical position such as that
presumed by Montmorency in his ' simple dire '. I t is true
that Wellington failed in all his efforts to avert intervention
in Spain ; his task was perhaps too big for him. But his resis-
tance to the powers' proposals impressed most of his contem-
poraries so strongly that it has been seriously suggested that his
raising of the question of the Spanish colonies was a cunning piece
of diplomacy meant as a counterblast to the unacceptable decision
of the congress to withdraw the allied ambassadors from Madrid.6
This was not the case, but it adds another item to the mass of
evidence which goes to prove that, though he made some mistakes,6
1
 Nettement, vi. 273.
* Green in Transactions of the Royal Hist. Soc, 1918, p. 09.
' Memoir on the Observations of the French Minister respecting Spain (Wellington,
Supplementary Dispatches, sec. u, i. 501 ; also below, Mettemioh to Neumann).
* See Wellington's dispatch of 29 October 1822 (Wellington, Supplementary Dis-
patches, sec. n, L 460).
• Letter of Chateaubriand of 28 November 1822 (Villele, iii. 248 ; also vide
Treitsohke, Geschichic Deulschlands, i. 491).
• E. g. the information given to a Spanish agent at Verona, which leaked back to
Montmorency via Madrid and Paris (ante, p. 205 n.). This, however, was almost
 at The U
niversity of British Colom
bia Library on July 8, 2015
http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
1920 WELLINGTON AT VERONA 579
Wellington acted honourably at Verona, and that the failure was
not due to disloyalty to his official chief.
H. M. LACKLAND.
I
Staate-Arohiv, Vienna. 21 September 1822.
NEUMANN TO METTERNICH
Les auspices aoua lesquelles [Canning] est entre au Ministere ne sont
pas faites pour flatter son amour-propre. H avait voulu d'abord faire le
fier, mais le Due de Wellington a adouci ses acrupulea et aes amis lui ont
conseille d'accepter, vu que l'occasion ne se representeroit peut-etre plus :
il a done cede, et a promia tout ce qu'on exigoit de lui, e'est-a-dire, de auivre
en tout le systeme de la presente administration. Le Roi en lui remettant
les sceaux lui a dit devant ses ministres que ce n'etait qu'a condition
qu'il marcheroit aur la m&me ligne que son predecesseur, qu'il les lui con-
fiait. On dit que le Roi a montre beaucoup de dignite dans cette occasion,
mais il n'en est pas moina vrai qu'il a ete force et que Mr. Canning sent
qu'il est l'homme de la necesaite et non celui du choix de sa Majeste. . . .
Mr. Canning tiendra-t-il la promeaae qu'il a donnee de ne s'ecarter en
rien de la conduite de ses collegues ? C'est ce qu'il faut esperer, mais
ce que d'apres les antecedents on ne pourra croire que loraqu'on l'aura
vu. H n'est pas bon a faire comme les autres, . . . et je doute qu'il se
laisse influencer longtempa par Ld. Liverpool, il cherchera a lui gajer la
main, et comment esperer que le Roi avec toutes les meilleures intentions
puisse resistor a son Ministere a'il n'a pu refuaer a Ld. Liverpool et empficher
l'admission d'un homme, qu'il hait du fond de son ame ? Ld. Londonderry
et le Roi avoient un metne syateme qu'ils ont soutenu au travers des plus
grands obstacles et des plus grands dangers.
Dans le demier et memorable entrevu de ce ministre avec le Roi, il
lui dit: ' Sire, il faut dire adieu a l'Europe, vous et moi seuls, nous le con-
noissons et l'avona aauve. Personne apres moi ne connoit plus lea afEairea
du continent.'1 H continua a faire de granda elogea au Roi pour la per-
apicacite avec laquelle il avoit juge l'etat critique des affaires et la per-
severance qu'il avoit mise dans la poursuite de ses desseins. Le Roi en
fut frappe, d'autant plus qu'il y avait dana le ton et les manieres de cet
homme incomparable un air de prediction qui annoncoit l'affreuse cata-
strophe que le Roi n'avait trop apprehende. Ld. Londonderry, aachant qu'il
avait pour soutien aon auguste Maitre, suivait avec. energie un ayateme
souvent contrarie par la timidite de ses collegues. Le Roi, de aon cote,
etait aflermi dana ses ideea par la maniere dont aon ministre lea defendait
au conseil et au parlement, il y avoit identite de vuea ou de principea, une
confiance et garantie reciproques.
Tout cela vient a cesser et le Roi est isole, non seulement defiant de
ses miniatres, maia les halssant tous plus ou inoins, sans en excepter
certainly not known on 8 November, when the French diplomatists had a violent
argument ae to whether England would intervene or not (Gabrioc, quoted in Revue
des Deux Mondti, czliii. 565). It is pouible that Wellington gave this information
to the Spanish agent in the hope that the knowledge that England would not help
them would make the Spanish more conciliatory towards France.
1
 This need not be taken literally. It is quite likely that Londonderry said it, but
it does not follow that he believed it.
F p 2
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580 WELLINGTON AT VERONA October
Ld. Liverpool. Le Chancellier et Mr. Peel sont lea seuls qu'il distingue.
Je ne parle pas du Due de Wellington, il est sur une ligne a part: le Roi le
regarde dans ce moment comme le seul ami qu'il ait et comme son sauveur.
La position du Roi vis-a-vis de son Minist&re ofEre done une des com-
binaisons les plus singulicres, pour ne pas dire lea plus malheureuses.
Au milieu de tout cela nous n'avons que deux individus qui nous soient
decidement favorables: e'est le Roi lui-meme et le Due de Wellington,
qui tous deux ont une veritable veneration pour l'auguste personne de
notre souverain, et un attachement r£el pour V.A. C'est done vers ces
deux objets que nous devons nous diriger, c'est a soutenir le Due vis-a-vis
de ses collogues, vis-a-vis du monde, et je dirais de lui-me'me (car il se
laisse quelques fois entrainer par sa bonte"), qu'il faut nous appliquer.
II faut le placer sur un piedestal si 61ev6 que Mr. Canning ni personne ne
puisse l'atteindre : il faut mettre tous nos soins a cimenter cette harnionie
qui existe si heureusement entre le Roi et le Due, celui-ci a dans ce moment
l'avantage sur M. fanning qui est tellement novice dans les affaires
etrange'res qu'il faut le gagner de vitesse dans ce qu'il va se faire a Vienne :
ce noviciat du reste ne peut pas durer longtemps. . . . [Wellington] a une
amiti6 toute particuliere pour V.A., c'est lui qui devra remplacer dans les
conseils du Roi la perte irreparable que vous avez faite, mon Prince, en
Lord Londonderry.
II
Steats-Arcbiv, Vienna. 2 Decembre 1822.
V6rone. Particuliire.
METTERNICH TO NEUMANN
. . . Le Due nous quitte mecontent de nous tous. Je trouve sa tete
si une [sic] affaiblie, pour le moins extrSmement irritable, comme une suite
assez natureOe de la grave maladie qu'il vient de faire. Sa position est
d'un autre cote d'une grande difficult^ : elle eut et6 telle pour tout
ministre : elle a du l'Stre plus encore pour un homme qui n'a pas les
qualites les plus indispensables pour un diplomate. Aussi le Due est-il alle
chercher dans les autres ce qu'il avait du ne chercher qu'en lui-meme. Le
temps et la reflexion lui feraient voir plus juste et c'est a cela que personne
ne peut travailler. Quand je vous parle de I'humeur du Due, je ne l'etends
toutefois que sur ses relations d'affaires, car toutes celles personnelles ont
6t4 bonnes et surtout avec moi. Vous le connaissez et vous savez par
consequent qu'il est fort accessible a la cajolerie. Celle-ci ne lui a point
6te 6pargn6e. On a eu pour lui le soin de creer des distinctions particu-
lieres. H a &t& traite a Vienne et ici comme Mardchal. II a din£ seul avec
sa Majeste Imperiale : il aura trouv6 a son passage a Milan des soins aux-
quels nous ne sommes pas toujours habitues : aussi ce qui a dft se faire
s'est fait, rnais ce qui n'a point 6t6 possible, n'a point pu se faire, et ce qui
plus que tout eut ete impossible, e'eut 6t6 de le satisfaire sur le point
de vue politique des Cours dans la seule affaire importante pour lui. II
dit que tout le monde a tort. II est possible que tel puisse 6tre le cas, mais
il ne s'est donne aucune peine de nous tracer le chemin de la raison. Dire
que la revolution rle l'Espagne n'exerce aucune influence sur l'Europe . . .
ec n'est pas dire une raison, mais c'est exprimer un sentiment que con-
tredit le sentiment general et en particulier celui de la France entiere.
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